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The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and their 
Consequences 
 
A recent study found that America “spends five times as much as its 
major industrial competitors on personal-injury wrangling . . . [and] that 
over the last two generations the cost of injury litigation rose 
fourteenfold after inflation, while the size of the real U.S. economy rose 
threefold.”1 Another survey reported, “American tort claims [run] at least 
ten times higher [than Britain’s], malpractice claims [are] thirty to forty 
times higher, and product claims [are] nearly a hundred times higher, in 
each case per capita.”2 These reports, and other studies of a similar 
nature, represent substantial evidence of a “litigation explosion” that is 
consuming the productivity, profits, and general effectiveness of many 
American industries.3 Pointing to such information, a broad coalition of 
lawmakers, politicians, scholars, business leaders, and citizens now 
petition for substantial reformation of the judicial system.4 This Article 
introduces the reforms proposed to reduce litigation.5 Each of the 
proposals must be carefully considered, as serious constitutional and 
practical problems accompany the benefits associated with each of them. 
Section I summarizes evidence establishing the existence of a 
litigation explosion and introduces the concept in general terms. Section 
II examines the proposal of fee shifting. Section III considers the merits 
and consequences of statutorily-imposed caps on damages. Section IV 
evaluates the proposal of stricter limitations on the methods and manner 
whereby lawyers solicit clients and reviews the legal principles that 
already restrict the nature and scope of permissible lawyer advertising. 
Section V reviews allegations that frivolous lawsuits impose a substantial 
burden on the legal system that can be neatly eliminated by the 
imposition of certification of merit requirements. Section VI concludes 
 1. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA 
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 7 (Truman Talley Books 1991). 
 2. Id. (citing Patrick S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American 
Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1012). 
 3. But see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 
735 (Aspen 2002) (“As with all other issues in the fight over tort law, the seriousness of the problem 
is hotly disputed.”). 
 4. See infra note 6, and accompanying text. 
 5. While this paper does not purport to address all of the proposals for reform, it does 
attempt to identify and explore those proposals that are most frequently levied. 
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by noting that serious constitutional and practical consequences plague 
all of the proposals. 
 
I.  THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 
 
The term “litigation explosion” describes the contemporary 
perception that litigation is increasingly prevalent in the United States 
and burdensome to society. The existence of the litigation explosion and 
the significance of its consequences continue to be debated points. 
Nevertheless, the litigation explosion has become a battle cry for a broad 
array of lawmakers, politicians, scholars, business leaders, and citizens.6 
These individuals contend that something must be done to reduce 
litigation, which they view as “costly and inefficient.”7 Professor Miller 
aptly sets forth their position: 
 
Increased litigation is said to result in substantial costs and delay. One 
study of the expenditures in asbestos litigation in the federal court 
system found that only thirty-seven cents of each dollar expended by 
defendants and insurers went to the victim, with legal fees and other 
transaction costs consuming the remainder. Accompanying this rise in 
costs seems to be an increase in the length of time that it takes to 
adjudicate or otherwise dispose of a dispute. Other problems associated 
with the “litigation explosion” are the harassment of innocent 
defendants, people not entering the medical profession or leaving 
because of the high cost of insurance or the fear of litigation, and, 
paradoxically, the denial of effective relief to deserving claimants.8 
 
The debate about the litigation explosion may be tainted, to some 
degree, by exaggerations and overstatements.9 However, examining the 
issue is important because evidence of its existence is accumulating and 
because the litigation explosion debate has attained a level of substantial 
prominence.10 One scholar commented that a substantial body of 
 6. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985–86 (2003) (noting that various sectors have expressed concern about 
increasing amounts of litigation and the effects that it is having on our society and systems). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 986–87. 
 9. The author does not attempt to estimate the effect that the filing of numerous claims 
might have on various American industries, but acknowledges that the topic is one that is, at times, 
subject to bias, overstatement, and exaggeration. 
 10. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 
62, 62 (1985) (“[T]he past decade of high anxiety over the burdens placed on our judicial system . . . 
has fairly been termed a litigation explosion . . . .”). 
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evidence supports the notion of a litigation explosion. Specifically, he 
stated, “[l]itigation and its threat have begun to metastasize to virtually 
every sector of the economy.”11 Evidence tending to establish the 
existence of the litigation explosion and its consequences can be found in 
(A) the employment context, (B) the healthcare industry, and (C) in 
many other professional contexts. 
 
A.  Employment, the American Workplace, and the Litigation Explosion 
 
According to one report, a surge of more than 100,000 employee 
suits is overwhelming California courts.12 These suits accuse employers 
of various offenses, including: “wrongful firing, wrongful failure to 
promote, and departure from policies spelled out in company 
employment booklets.”13 The increasing number of claimants in the 
system has forced many petitioning employees to wait years before 
having their employment matters finally adjudicated.14 This backlog 
affects the administration of justice in a variety of ways.15 One scholar 
even questioned the wisdom of a legislative proposal he felt was 
substantively justifiable because implementation of the proposal would 
aggravate “the litigation explosion already present in the field of 
employment discrimination.”16 That scholar believed that adoption of the 
proposal was exceptionally dangerous because “employment 
discrimination is one of the fastest growing areas of civil litigation, with 
courts reporting that they are being swamped by these claims.”17 Despite 
the fact that the law may have protected important employee rights, the 
scholar questioned the practical implications of opening another avenue 
for the presentation of employee claims. In summary, a significant body 
of evidence indicates that increasing litigation imposes a substantial 
burden on American workers, employers, and consumers. 
 11. OLSON, supra note 1, at 7. 
 12. Id. at 18. 
 13. Id. at 8. 
 14. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to 
Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 593 (1995) 
(“Judges see the employment litigation explosion adding to the backlog that forces litigants to wait 
for years before getting to trial . . . .”). In addition to overwhelming both judges and judicial staff, 
the backlog frustrates litigants whose conflicts are extended by the judicial system’s inability to get 
these matters speedily resolved. 
 15. Legislative enactments that might alleviate problems that exist in the workplace are 
sometimes refused and vetoed because of their potential to contribute to the litigation explosion. 
 16. Peter J. Longo, The Human Genome Project’s Threat to the Human Constitution: 
Protections from Nebraska Constitutionalism, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 17 (1999). 
 17. Id. (citing Karen A. Haase, Mixed Metaphores: Model Civil Jury Instructions for Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Claims, 76 NEB L. REV. 900, 901 (1997)) (emphasis added). 
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B.  Healthcare, the Insurance Industry, and the Litigation Explosion 
 
Increasing claims plague the health care industry too. “For many 
[physicians], a labor of love has become an agonizing search for 
insurance to ensure continued practice in an industry for which they 
trained eight, fifteen, or even twenty years.”18 The increasing cost of 
malpractice insurance is, at least partially, the result of more claims and 
expanding jury verdicts.19 Increasing costs impact all levels of the 
healthcare hierarchy, including physicians, health care providers, and the 
very individuals seeking medical treatment. Various statistics, reports, 
and articles reveal the significance of the problem.20 Nationwide, 
insurance premiums have increased by 50 percent since 1975.21 A Wall 
Street analyst estimated that healthcare costs grew “seven to eight times 
faster than revenue” for one California healthcare provider.22 Some argue 
that these cost increases are attributable to implementation of cutting 
edge treatments. But, medical research was introducing new treatment 
options in previous years too. Thus, recent increases in cost of healthcare 
are not solely a result of new treatment options. 
The increasing cost of healthcare puts a pinch on employers desirous 
to provide such security for employees. For example, the sizeable 
General Electric Company reported that its earnings “went up seven 
percent [in 2002], but [its] healthcare costs went up fourteen percent.”23 
Further explaining the depth and breadth of current trends in the 
healthcare industry, one author noted: 
 
Health care costs [now] consume more than fourteen percent of the 
United States gross domestic product. Medicare spending alone totaled 
approximately $162 billion and $198 billion for fiscal years 1995 and 
1996 respectively . . . the problem of rising healthcare costs [is] well 
known.24
 18. Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps: Getting 
Beyond Band-Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 
30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 502 (2004). 
 19. Increased jury verdicts and an increased number of claims both impose a costly burden 
on insurers who must find money to pay the bills whether those verdicts are increasingly frequent or 
increasingly large. 
 20. Many of these reports and studies are explained in the remaining portions of this Section. 
 21. Liang & Ren, supra note 18, at 505. 
 22. Reed Abelson, Already Battered, Tenet Reduces Earnings Forecast for Rest of Year, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at C1. 
 23. Steven Greenhouse, Stirring Words, Realist Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, at BU2. 
 24. Judith Parker, Corporate Practice of Medicine: Last Stand or Final Downfall, 29 AHA J. 
HEALTH LAW 160 (1996). 
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Malpractice insurance is increasingly expensive, and healthcare costs 
are rising as a result. Pinpointing the cause of rising malpractice 
insurance is difficult because numerous factors simultaneously contribute 
to the cost increases. Potentially relevant factors include fluctuating 
interest rates,25 greed (in both the insurance companies and medical 
professionals),26 a more dangerous living environment,27 and the 
extension of life expectancy,28 to name a few. Recognizing the potential 
impact of these alternative factors, adherents to the litigation explosion 
theory maintain that increasing lawsuits are the principal culprits. Their 
claim is supported by several statistical studies. One such study emerged 
as the tort reform debate raged in Florida. At that time, the Florida 
Hospital Association hired Milliman USA, Inc. (“Milliman”) to evaluate 
the cause of rising insurance premiums. Among other things, the 
Milliman Report revealed that the total amount of paid claims in Florida 
for the year 2000 was more than 150 percent higher than the amount paid 
in 1991.29 The study also found that the frequency of medical 
malpractice claims in Florida increased significantly between 1991 and 
2000. In 1991, 4.82 claims were filed per 100,000 residents; in 2000, 
7.56 claims were filed per 100,000 residents.30 Accordingly, the 
 25. See LAYLOCK, supra note 3, at 171. Laycock explained the effect that fluctuating interest 
rates can have on the price of insurance: In the early 1980’s, when insurance rates were very high, 
the insurance industry set rates below the expected level of losses to attract immediate business. 
Premium dollars could be immediately invested: claims would be paid years later. Investment 
earnings more than offset the underwriting losses. When interest rates declined insurers lost money, 
but the plaintiff’s bar said that was the natural consequence of the insurance market’s relation to 
interest rates. On this view of the facts, big premium increases were also the result of declining 
interest rates. Insureds got an unusually large return from their insurers’ investment when rates were 
high; now that the interest rates are low, their premiums have to cover the nearly the full value of 
their expected claims. 
Id. 
 26. Avoiding meaningful analysis by labeling insurance providers as “greedy,” while popular 
in current political rhetoric, disregards the fact that while greed is inherent in capitalism, the emotion 
also serves as a check upon itself. If an insurance company charges exorbitant rates for the sole 
purpose of accentuating already healthy profits, other start-up insurers (also “greedy” for a profit) 
will, in time, provide those services at a reduced rate. 
 27. In our industrialized and automated society, accidents and injuries are more likely than 
ever to occur. Additonally, recreational activities such as skiing, rock climbing, and other such 
activities, increasingly put the insured in harm’s way. 
 28. An aging population requires more medical services, and more medical services increase 
the likelihood of malpractice and injury as well as the likelihood of tort litigation. Additionally, an 
aging population indicates that more medical procedures are being performed on the elderly; such 
operations are inherently more unpredictable and dangerous than similar operations performed on 
younger individuals. See e.g., The U.S. Death Rate Drops; Life Expectancy Rises, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 19, 2006, A1 (“The government also said yesterday that the US life expectancy had inched up 
again to a record high of 77.9 years.”). 
 29. See LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 136. 
 30. Id. 
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Milliman report seems to indicate that insurance rates have increased 
because of a significant spike in the number of legal claims filed and 
because of the consequential increase in expenditures to defend and 
satisfy those claims.31
 
C.  Impact of the Litigation Explosion: Beyond the Employment and 
Healthcare Context 
 
Increased litigation affects a broad range of people and industries. 
Studies reveal that professionals in various sectors worry about shielding 
themselves from the burden of lawsuits and litigation. For example, one 
study noted that, “[malpractice insurance] is a crushing expense for many 
accountants, nurses, amateur sports umpires, and local charity 
volunteers.”32 While these industries are not as effected by the litigation 
explosion as participants in other industries are, the effect of increasing 
litigiousness is broadly felt. Individuals pressing for reform of the 
judicial system contend that the propensity of Americans to litigate when 
problems arise is driving up costs and imposing a burden on various 
industrial sectors, groups, and individuals.33 They contend that the 
litigation explosion “has given the legal profession a more and more 
prominent role in the running of the business and medical worlds, 
academia and public service, entertainment and sports—virtually every 
walk of American life.”34
A substantial and accumulating body of evidence lends support to 
the existence of a litigation explosion. While the evidence does not 
conclusively establish its existence,35 or define its parameters and 
implications, the litigation explosion has become a topic at the forefront 
 31. But see The de-Haven Smith Report. It should be noted that other studies tend to produce 
alternative results. The Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers commissioned a similar study. The 
Academy reported its finding in the de-Haven Smith Report (“Smith Report”). That report found that 
the total number of malpractice claims peaked in 1996, then dropped in the ensuing years, before 
resuming a temporary upward trend again in 1999. The report also concluded that the number of 
claims involving extraordinary amounts had not increased in frequency during the past decade. 
Contrary to the Milliman Report, the Smith Report seems to indicate that the number of claims filed 
has not increased, and implies that increasing insurance premiums must be attributable to other 
factors. 
 32. OLSON, supra note 1, at 8. 
 33. See Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 89-7 at 59 (statement of Rep. 
Biggins) (stating that the Girl Scouts in Southern Illinois must sell 53,000 boxes of cookies a year to 
cover their liability expenses). 
 34. OLSON, supra note 1, at 9. 
 35. See e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 996 (“The foregoing shows that the supposed litigation 
crisis is the product of assumption; that reliable empirical data is in short supply; and that data exist 
that support any proposition. Thus, one should be cautious and refrain from trumpeting conclusions 
on the subject lest it distract us from serious inquiry.”) (emphasis added). 
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of current political, legal, and social debate.36 It has already “engaged the 
attention of all three branches of the federal government as well as many 
state legislatures.”37 Further, “an avalanche of literature, both 
professional and popular, has addressed the problem and advanced 
numerous overlapping solutions.”38 Accumulating evidence and 
commentary supports the notion that a litigation explosion is occurring 
within the United States judicial system even if questions as to the cause 
and desirability of the explosion remain unexplained. 
The time has come for the legal profession to quickly and thoroughly 
examine the numerous proposals that have been advanced to deal with 
the litigation explosion. These reform proposals include: an absolute cap 
on non-economic damages, the total abolishment of joint and several 
liability, shortening the time wherein suits may be filed in accordance 
with the applicable statute of limitations, a proposed limitation on the 
rates that can be charged in contingency fee arrangements, and a fee-
shifting system analogous to the British approach.39 This Article does not 
review all of the proposed reforms. Instead, it considers the effect that 
fee shifting, damage caps, tighter restrictions on attorney advertising, and 
more rigid measures to preclude frivolous lawsuits, will have on the 
American judicial system if they are generally adopted. 
 
II.  FEE SHIFTING TO REDUCE LITIGATION 
 
Proponents of reform contend that adopting the British fee-shifting 
model represents a viable alternative to decrease the number of claims 
filed and eliminate the consequences of the litigation explosion.40 
Specifically, these persons allege that the current approach, whereby 
each party bears its own legal fees and expenses, provides no incentive 
for a plaintiff to assess personally the merits of his or her case before 
 36. Id. at 985. (“The contemporary perception of a crisis in the judicial system first became 
prominent in the 1970s . . . . For example, former Vice President Dan Quayle, speaking as the head 
of the President’s Council on Competitiveness, maintained that federal civil litigation had almost 
tripled between 1960 and 1990, and that in 1989 alone eighteen million new lawsuits were filed—
almost one lawsuit for every ten American adults. The recent outcry in this country over the social 
costs of civil litigation is unprecedented in its decibel level and sense of urgency, bringing together a 
coalition of politicians, lawmakers, business people, and scholars that often bridges traditional lines 
between conservative and liberal ideologies.”) (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 986. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 170–71 (describing many proposals to rectify the 
litigation explosion, the healthcare crisis, and the increasing legal expenditures and costs that some 
believe are plaguing American industries). 
 40. Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The 
Promise of Reverse Cost Fee Shifting, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 317, 317 (2005). 
  
186 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
filing suit.41 They seek to replace the current American approach42 with a 
rule that requires the losing party to bear the legal costs associated with 
litigating the particular matter. This, they contend, would squeeze many 
lawsuits out of the system by discouraging substantively “weaker” 
lawsuits.43
To understand the significance of this proposed reform, a brief 
review of the British Rule and American Rule is helpful. 
 
A.  The British (“Loser Pays”) Rule 
 
The English legal system employs the “loser pays” rule, to provide 
remedies after adjudication.44 In its purest form, the “loser pays” rule 
requires the defeated party to pay all of the prevailing party’s attorney 
fees.45 Accordingly, liability for legal expenses automatically flows from 
a defendant to the prevailing plaintiff, or from a plaintiff to the prevailing 
defendant upon judicial resolution of their dispute.46 This shifting of fees 
occurs automatically and the party adjudged to have lost the case is liable 
for the legal expenses that he or she imposed on the prevailing party. The 
British Rule does not consider the margin of victory in determining the 
losing parties liability to reimburse legal fees.47 Nor does it evaluate the 
substantive basis of the losing parties claims. 
Proponents argue that the British Rule promotes fundamental 
principles underlying the law of remedies by restoring the prevailing 
party more fully to its rightful position48—the position that he or she 
 41. The combination of plaintiffs whose resources are protected by a contingency fee 
structure and counsel who may invest a minimal amount of time attempting to settle these cases fails 
to encourage even cursory analysis of the merits before a claim is filed. 
 42. Which has been deemed the “American Rule.” 
 43. Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 79 
(Winter, 1997) (The approach would “encourage stronger lawsuits, and discourage weaker ones by 
rewarding victorious claims and imposing a penalty for those that lose.”); see also Thomas D. Rowe, 
Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 143 (1984). 
While the effect of fee-shifting might have a particularly strong effect in contingency cases, 
imposing a potential penalty on the plaintiff for losing would cause self-analysis prior to filing in all 
cases. 
 44. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocations: The Injured Person’s 
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993). 
 45. This is known as two-sided fee shifting. A prevailing party is entitled to legal fees from 
its opponent regardless of whether the prevailing party is the plaintiff or the defendant. 
 46. See Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 320. 
 47. See Thomas D. Rowe, Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-
Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 321–22 (1998) 
(arguing that a responsible system should consider the margin of victory as well as the substantive 
grounds upon which a defeated party’s case was based before requiring that party to compensate the 
prevailing party for its legal expenses). 
 48. See e.g., LAYLOCK, supra note 3, at 15 (“The fundamental principle of [remedies] is to 
restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the position that he would have been in but for the 
  
179] THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 187 
 
would have occupied had the wrong never occurred.49 To fully restore a 
prevailing plaintiff to its “rightful position,” the law must provide 
damages for the particular injury that she sustained and for the legal 
expenses that plaintiff incurred in protecting pertinent rights. Conversely, 
a defendant who establishes that she was not liable for the complained-of 
damages is entitled to compensation for the fees and costs required to 
establish her innocence. 
Advocates of the British Rule contend that it provides a substantial 
incentive for parties to settle their differences out of court.50 In close 
cases,51 parties might settle to avoid the risk of being liable for legal 
expenses.52 Such settlements, proponents of the British Rule argue, 
would further reduce the amount of litigation crowding the judicial 
system. 
 
B.  The Current Approach or American Rule 
 
Shortly after gaining its independence in 1796, the United States 
departed from the British fee-shifting rule.53 The United States Supreme 
Court explained the reason for abolishing the British Rule in the case of 
Arcambel v. Wiseman.54 In that case, the Court held that attorney fees 
were not recoverable unless specifically authorized by legislation. After 
striking down the award of attorney fees at issue in the case, the Court 
stated, “We do not think that this charge [of attorney fees from the losing 
party] ought to be allowed. The general practice of the United States is in 
opposition to it . . . .”55 American judges and legislators deeply desired 
open access to courtrooms. One justice underscored the importance of 
such access, explaining: 
 
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In 
wrong.”). 
 49. The author acknowledges that some juries might already adjust the damage award to 
effectuate a more full recovery, but simultaneously notes that the British Rule, standing by its 
expressed terms, more fully comports with this principle of the law of remedies than the American 
Rule does when limited to its expressed terms. 
 50. Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 331. 
 51. The term “close cases” refers to cases that are likely to require a significant amount of 
time and money before they are resolved. 
 52. Uncertainty that leads to settlement is more likely when the consequences of litigation are 
raised. Accordingly, parties to litigation will be more likely to settle when additional liabilities are 
imposed upon them. 
 53. In essence, the new approach treated legal fees as an ancillary matter. As an independent 
and separate matter, it was contemplated and awarded without reference to the underlying cause of 
action. 
 54. 3 U.S. 306 (1796). 
 55. Id. 
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an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and 
lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and 
most essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each 
State to the citizens of all . . . .56
 
To ensure the access it valued, the Court adopted the “American 
Rule.” The rule imposes upon each litigant the responsibility to bear his 
or her own legal expenses.57 The American Rule construes legal fees “as 
an ancillary matter, separate from the merits,” of a case and provides that 
a prevailing litigant will not recover such expenditures unless 
“specifically authorized by a particular rule or statute.”58
 
C.  Implications of Replacing the American Rule with the British Rule 
 
Replacing the American Rule with the British Rule would reduce 
litigation. After all, “[i]t is self-evident that parties make litigation and 
settlement decisions based on the procedural setting, and not just on the 
merits, of a given case.”59 By imposing an obligation on parties to pay 
the legal costs of a prevailing opponent, the law would create a stiff 
procedural deterrent to litigation.60 As a general matter, only plaintiffs 
who are substantially confident about the merits of their case would file 
claims. By increasing the potential costs of litigation, adopting the 
British Rule would reduce the filing of claims.61 However, replacing the 
American Rule with the British Rule is not without consequences. 
 
1.  Adoption of the British Rule would reduce access to courts. 
 
“Citizens in the United States place a high premium on the option to 
go to court, and the deterrent effect of the British Rule undoubtedly 
closes the courthouse doors to many low-income parties.”62 Aware that 
 56. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
 57. See e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) 
(superceded by statute as stated in Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978)). 
 58. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 912–15. 
 59. Molot, supra note 43, at 60 (“In particular, lawyers and clients alike understand that the 
cost of litigation may affect outcomes.”). The potential cost of litigation may also affect the client’s 
willingness to pursue a legal remedy and incur legal costs. See infra note 172 and accompanying 
text. 
 60. Thus, in this context the question becomes whether the deterrent provided is too 
substantial and arduous. 
 61. As explained in part II C 1., proponents of the British Rule are correct when they assert 
that its adoption would reduce the number of claims presented to American tribunals. Judicial 
systems that adhere to the British approach experience less litigation per capita than courts in the 
United States do. See e.g., Atiyah, supra note 2. 
 62. Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 331. 
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limiting access to such an extensive degree is generally unacceptable, 
some reform advocates have tempered their demands by lobbying for 
proportional fee shifting.63 Under this approach a plaintiff is only 
responsible for a portion of a particular defendant’s legal fees.64 While 
proportional fee shifting might impede access to courts less than 
traditional fee shifting would,65 any risk of out-of-pocket expenses is a 
substantial deterrent to poor plaintiffs.66
Wealthy individuals in possession of monetarily insignificant claims 
might also hesitate before introducing their claims into the court system. 
This is because the potential benefit of prevailing on a minor claim 
frequently fails to outweigh the costs associated with protecting that 
right, especially when the added risk of being liable for the prevailing 
parties legal fees is included in the analysis. 
If the British Rule is adopted, it is safe to assume that litigation will 
decrease. However, access to the judicial system will be severely 
limited.67
 
2.  By adopting the British Rule, the judicial system would unduly favor 
parties with disposable resources and perhaps violate the Due Process 
Clause. 
 
Though it is intertwined with the previous point, that adoption of the 
“British Rule” would reduce access to courts, it is worth noting 
separately that implementation of the British Rule may render the rights 
of the wealthy more secure than the rights of the poverty stricken or 
underprivileged.68 Adopting the British Rule is “particularly troubling 
 63. Id. This is also known as fee shifting by percentage. 
 64. See id. 
 65. For a poor plaintiff, the potential of being liable for $5500 may not be much more 
daunting than the potential of being liable for $11,000. Both amounts represent a substantial danger. 
 66. While a poor plaintiff may not have much money to lose, the risk of losing even a small 
amount is likely to be poignantly felt in most cases. 
 67. See Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (“The right to sue and 
defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of 
all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most 
essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each State to the citizens of all . . . .”). 
 68. See e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967), 
superceded by statute as stated by United Phosphorus v. Midland Fumigant, 21 F. Supp. 1255 (D. 
Kan. 1998), and Decorations For Generations, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26608 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2003). 
In support of the American Rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at best 
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and 
that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their 
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel. Also, the 
time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what 
constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial 
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because it imposes this chilling effect disproportionately on private 
litigants opposing individually wealthy or commercial defendants who 
rapidly accumulate legal expenses.”69 Two hypothetical, but realistic, 
examples sufficiently demonstrate the inequality that fee shifting 
imposes. 
In both cases, suppose that an uninsured plaintiff suffers a minor 
injury (perhaps a broken arm) as a result of a low-speed car crash with an 
uninsured driver. Upon examination of the case, the plaintiff’s attorney 
informs his client that the likelihood of establishing liability is 
approximately 60 percent, this being a “good case.” Hypothetical 
Plaintiff “A” falls into the middle socio-economic class, making 
approximately $115,000 per year. Plaintiff “A” has very little debt and 
some disposable income. Conversely Plaintiff “B” falls into a lower 
socio-economic class, making approximately $25,000 per year. Plaintiff 
“B” has little disposable money. 
Plaintiff “B” may hesitate to file a legal action because the threat of 
being responsible for the legal fees of the adverse party is very daunting 
and troubling in light of his financial situation. Conversely, a semi-
prosperous plaintiff such as Plaintiff “A” would worry less (to some 
degree) about incurring liability for the prevailing parties fees.70 This fact 
holds true even if a proportional approach71 to fee shifting is adopted 
instead of the traditional British Rule. In most instances an individual or 
entity with disposable income is more willing to assume financial risk 
than an individual with less income. The disparate treatment that a fee 
shifting system imposes on individuals is even more substantial when the 
financial status of the parties is more exaggerated. Thus, a multi-
millionaire or a large corporation would possess a far greater capacity to 
protect their legal rights than a similarly injured person with less income 
and assets.72
Fundamental principles of the American judicial system forbid 
treating litigants differently on the basis of their economic status.73 “Over 
the past two decades one of the most important trends in both judicial 
administration. (Emphasis added). 
 
 69. Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 331. 
 70. Though incurring liability is still a substantial consideration for Plaintiff A. 
 71. Under a proportional fee shifting approach, the losing party would be responsible for only 
a limited portion of the victorious party’s legal expenditures. While the potential amount of the 
party’s liability would decrease, a poor person still feels the loss of a set amount of money in a way 
that a wealthier person does not. 
 72. While this may already be the case, implementation of the British Rule in place of the 
American Rule would expand the disparity. 
 73. Mason v. Henderson, 35 F.Supp. 35, 37–38 (E.D. La. 1972) (“Due Process requires . . . 
that all persons, rich or poor, young or old, be accorded equal treatment.”). 
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and legislative decisions has been the enormous thrust to equalize the 
treatment of rich and poor in the courts.”74 Yet, fee shifting unequally 
deters poor people from filing claims. For this reason, fee-shifting 
systems contradict fundamental principles of equality and fairness that 
are imbedded in the American judicial system. 
In addition to treating participants differently depending on their 
financial status, adoption of the British Rule might provide additional 
incentive for wealthy parties to extend litigation and run up legal costs as 
an intimidation strategy.75 By such tactics, a wealthy defendant could 
gain a superior bargaining position. Additionally, such conduct would 
crowd the judicial system by keeping cases on court dockets for longer 
periods of time, and forcing judges to review more preliminary motions. 
 
3.  Exceptions to the American rule substantially limit its scope already. 
 
Many exceptions to the American Rule exist, though critics of the 
rule frequently fail to acknowledge them. “Cumulatively, these 
exceptions take a huge bite out of the American Rule.”76 In many 
instances, the rule that the prevailing party cannot recover attorney’s fees 
is subject to an exception already.77 The existence of these exceptions 
makes adoption of the British Rule seem less necessary. 
Adopting the British Rule will significantly affect the ability of 
citizens to petition courts for a redress of their grievances. Additionally, 
adoption of the British approach renders the rights of rich parties better 
protected than the rights of poor persons. Because these two 
consequences are significant, the judicial system should be particularly 
concerned about proposals that automatically shift fees to prevailing 
parties. 
 74. Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Tate v. United States, 359 
F.2d 245, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that “equal treatment for rich and poor” is a vital component 
of the judicial system); McCord v. Polozola, 555 F.Supp. 996, 997 (N.D. La. 1983) (“Beyond a 
doubt one of the most important functions of a federal court is to steadfastly guard the rights and 
privileges secured by the Constitution . . . [and] a court’s obligation in this regard is owed equally to 
the rich and poor.”) (emphasis added). 
 75. Consider a case where a poor plaintiff brings suit against a wealthy corporate defendant. 
The defendant could obtain unequal bargaining power by extending and delaying the legal process to 
expand its legal bill. As that figure increases, the Plaintiffs willingness to settle the case in 
accordance with the terms of the defendant would also increase. While this strategy is employed in 
the current American system, adoption of the British system would provide additional incentive for 
its implementation. 
 76. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 913. 
 77. David W. Robertson, Court-Awarded Attorneys’ Fees in Maritime Cases: The “American 
Rule” in Admiralty, 27 J. MAR. L & COM. 507 (1996). Robertson identifies various exceptions 
including: statutory exceptions, the bad faith litigation exception, contract exceptions, a family law 
exception, the collateral litigation exception, and the contempt-of-court exception. 
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III.  DAMAGE CAPS TO CURB THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 
 
Damage caps are another proposed response to the litigation 
explosion.78 These caps aim to reduce the number of claims filed by 
removing the incentive to file a claim that accompanies the potential of 
an extraordinary verdict.79 Damage caps also minimize the impact of the 
litigation explosion by alleviating the legal expenses and financial 
vulnerability that numerous claims impose on defendants.80 Despite these 
potential benefits, damage cap statutes are constitutionally controversial 
and blatantly unfair when applied in some instances.81
 
A.  Constitutional Implications 
 
The enactment of damage caps raises significant constitutional 
concerns. 82 Judicial consideration of these caps generally focuses on 
whether caps unconstitutionally modify the right to a jury trial, and on 
whether they represent undue usurpation of judicial power. Indeed, “[t]he 
constitutionality of damage caps has been one of the most controversial 
aspects of . . . reform in many states . . . .”83 Courts have reached 
inconsistent conclusions when called upon to determine whether damage 
caps comport with constitutional doctrines. The Virginia Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of a damage cap84 in the case of 
 78. Matthew W. Stevens, Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995 Amendments to Chapter 99B, 
the Products Liability Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2240, 2240 (1996) (“From the movements beginnings in 
the mid-1980s, states have attempted to contain the apparent litigation explosion of the last decade 
with a wide array of legislation, including damage caps and other changes . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 79. Because the sky seems to be the limit, plaintiffs frequently overestimate the value of their 
cases. Such overestimation provides an incentive to litigate. 
 80. According to this theoretical advantage, damage caps do not significantly reduce 
litigation. Instead, they alleviate the financial burden that numerous claims impose on parties who 
frequently find themselves the targets of these lawsuits. Damage caps aim to ensure that that liability 
is predictable and manageable for defendants who might otherwise be overwhelmed by numerous 
claims. 
 81. Many states have already enacted statutory provisions to limit damage recoveries. 
Accordingly, cases, commentary, and information regarding the consequences of damage caps are 
developing. 
 82. See Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Constitutional Comparisons and Converging Histories: 
Historical Developments in Equal Educational Opportunity Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and the New South African Constitution, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 853 
(1999) (Author notes that adoption of a constitution represents adoption of a foundation for the 
citizens and society.). As constitutional precepts are the foundational precepts upon which society is 
built, a proposed restraint that raises constitutional questions should be carefully considered as the 
proposal has substantial potential to shift society in unanticipated ways.). 
 83. Chad E. Stewart, Damage Caps in Alabama’s Civil Justice System: An Uncivil War 
within the State, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 201, 203 (1999). 
 84. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–581.15 (1989) (limiting the amount of damages recoverable in a 
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Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals.85 In that case, the plaintiff 
suffered severe and permanent injuries. The trial court attributed the 
injuries to the negligence of an attending physician. The court reduced 
the jury verdict of $2.75 million to $750,000 pursuant to a statute 
capping damages.86 Plaintiff appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, 
which held that the damage cap was constitutionally permissible and 
appropriately applied.87
The Florida Supreme Court reached the opposite result upon 
consideration of a similar damage cap. In the case of Smith v. 
Department of Insurance, that Court held that “the cap on noneconomic 
damages is contrary to Article I, § 2188 of the Florida Constitution.”89 
Specifically, the court stated: 
 
A plaintiff who receives a jury verdict for, [] $1,000,000, has not 
received a constitutional redress of injuries if the legislature statutorily, 
and arbitrarily, caps the recovery at $450,000. Nor, we add, because the 
jury verdict is being arbitrarily capped, is the plaintiff receiving the 
constitutional benefit of a jury trial as we have heretofore understood 
that right.90
 
The inconsistencies expressed in the Smith case and the Etheridge 
case aptly demonstrate the “deep split among state supreme courts over 
the constitutionality of damage caps.”91 While there is no consensus,92 
“the majority of courts reviewing challenges under the constitutions of 
their respective states have invalidated limitations on damages.”93 In 
addition to Alabama and Florida, the Illinois Supreme Court recently 
held that a damage cap provision violated the Illinois constitution.94 
Specifically, the Illinois Court held that the statutory cap violated the 
separation of powers doctrine as the cap unduly hindered the judicial 
branch’s power and obligation to prevent excessive verdicts through the 
medical malpractice action). 
 85. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989). 
 86. Id. at 526 (The statutory damage cap provided that compensatory damage awards in 
medical malpractice could not exceed $750,000 per occurrence.). 
 87. Id. at 526–27. 
 88. FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 21 (1987) (“The courts shall be open to every person for redress of 
any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.”). 
 89. Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987). 
 90. Id. at 1088–89 (emphasis added). 
 91. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 173. 
 92. Id. at 174 (“There is no serious claim that damage caps on state-law claims violate the 
federal constitution.”). 
 93. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n., 592 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1991). 
 94. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1064 (Ill. 1997). 
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remittitur power.95
Regardless of the case law that the individual reader finds most 
persuasive, these cases introduce constitutional considerations that must 
accompany responsible review of the merits and consequences of 
damage caps. Specifically, the reader should consider the effect of 
damage caps on (1) the right to a jury trial, and (2) the separation of 
powers doctrine before advocating the adoption of damage caps. 
 
1.  The right to a jury trial. 
 
The right to a jury trial is a constitutionally protected one.96 Yet, 
damage caps intrude on that right.97 While jurors retain discretion in the 
realm of liability, the ability of jurors to award the damages they deem 
proper is substantially limited when the legislature enacts a damage 
cap.98 Stripping this power from jurors is a monumental change. After 
all, “[a]ssessment of the quantum of damages as a function of the jury in 
actions at law [is] deeply entrenched” in our legal system.99
The adoption of statutory damage caps may, or may not, be 
constitutional.100 Regardless, implementation of these caps significantly 
limits the discretion and responsibility of jurors. In so doing, damage 
caps change traditional concepts about what happens in a jury trial. 
 
Damage caps reduce the litigant’s constitutional entitlement from one 
commanding that a jury reach a unanimous verdict on both the 
questions of liability and damages, to one requiring that a jury reach a 
unanimous verdict on the question of liability alone. Under this 
scheme, the jury reaches the question of damages only if not pre-
empted by legislative fiat from doing so.101
 
 95. Id. Whether they violate the right to a jury trial or not, the enactment of damage caps are 
inconsistent with the right to a jury trial as traditionally understood. See generally Smith, 507 So.2d 
1080. 
 96. See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VII (2006) (“In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”). 
 97. See e.g., Smith 507 So.2d at 1088–89 (wherein the Court felt like the intrusion was 
sufficient to render the damage cap provision unconstitutional). 
 98. By adopting a damage cap, the legislature inserts its determination in place of the juries 
with regard to liability and damages. 
 99. Paul Weiss, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment, 38 
CATH. U. L. REV. 737, 746 (1989)”The common law required a jury to assess a plaintiff’s damages 
whenever the amount sued for was an unliquidated or uncertain sum.” Id. Until the perceived 
litigation explosion of recent times “no one has seriously suggested that assessment of the amount of 
a plaintiff’s damages in a common law of action is anything but a question for the jury.” Id. 
 100. Smith and Etheridge reached different determinations on this point. 
 101. Weiss, supra note 99, at 765. 
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The implementation of damage caps would, at a minimum, modify 
the constitutional right to a jury trial and the nature of judicial 
proceedings. Recognition of this impact, and further consideration of its 
significance, should precede formal adoption of damage cap provisions. 
 
2.  Damage Caps Narrow, Perhaps Unconstitutionally, the Separation 
between Powers102
 
The legal doctrine of remittitur provides a “procedure by which trial 
and appellate judges reduce jury verdicts” that they deem excessive.103 
By the remittitur doctrine courts may reduce the jury verdict to the 
highest amount that the court deems reasonable in the circumstances.104 
Accordingly, courts already possess the power to review jury verdicts for 
reasonableness. Legislatures usurp this judicial power when they 
preemptively review the reasonableness of verdicts by adopting statutory 
damage caps.105
The doctrine of remittitur represents a more effective mechanism to 
review the reasonableness of awards106 than statutorily imposed damage 
caps do. Courts apply the remittitur concept upon examining the facts of 
the case. Legislative bodies, on the other hand, enact damage caps before 
the cases that the statute will govern even exist. Accordingly, damage 
caps frequently fail to properly address the presented situation.107 
Remittitur, on the other hand, is less arbitrary and more informed. Courts 
review the verdict in light of the facts to determine whether the amount 
awarded is reasonable. If the award is unreasonable, the presiding judge 
reduces it.108
Acknowledging the existence of remittitur tarnishes the appeal of 
damage caps, and upon deeper consideration even makes these caps 
appear entirely unnecessary. Perhaps using the doctrine of remittutur 
more frequently is a better way of responding to extraordinary verdicts 
than damage caps are. At a minimum, the legislature intrudes on the 
 102. This argument persuaded the Illinois Supreme Court to declare that a damage cap enacted 
by the state’s legislature was unconstitutional. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 
1064 (Ill. 1997). 
 103. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 189. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See e.g., Stewart, supra note 83, at 225. 
 106. See e.g., Levka v. City of Chicago, 748 F.2d 421 (1984) (jury returned a verdict of 
$50,000 in favor of the plaintiff). On appeal the court noted, “[T]he award of $50,000 in this case is 
grossly excessive and must be reduced.” Id. By the process of remittitur the court reduced the award 
to $25,000, which it believed was reasonable. Id. 
 107. The next section sets forth in detail the injustices that result from the statutory imposition 
of damage caps. 
 108. See generally Levka, 748 F.2d 421. 
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authority of the judicial branch, as provided by the remittitur doctrine, 
when it enacts damage caps. 
 
B.  Arbitrary Damage Caps Frequently Impose Harsh and Unfair Results 
 
Because legislators paint with broad strokes when they craft statutory 
law, damage cap provisions frequently impose harsh and unjust results in 
individual cases.109 The case of State v. DeFoor110 is illustrative. That 
case involved a damage cap that limited recovery against the state for 
traffic accidents to $400,000 per occurrence.111 In 1992, a state employee 
dislodged a boulder. It rolled down a mountain and struck a bus.112 Nine 
people were killed and approximately twenty-five injured.113 Application 
of the pertinent damage cap provision left each of the victims with the 
prospect of recovering a maximum of $11,000.114 Such absurd results 
inevitably attend legislative remedies that are enacted prior to the factual 
record that they govern.115 President Clinton noted his concern for harsh 
results that were unavoidable as he vetoed a federal damage cap 
proposal.116 Perhaps in so doing, he recognized the problem inherent in 
damage caps. There will always be extraordinary cases wherein 
application of definitive rules is improper. 
While damage caps alleviate the consequences of the litigation 
explosion, strict application of these caps also effectuates unjust results 
in individual cases. Lawmakers should contemplate and account for the 
potential for unjust results prior to enacting such caps. Similarly, 
legislators should consider the constitutional implications associated with 
damage caps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109. The breadth of cases to which a statute is intended to apply frequently renders the statute 
unresponsive to individual cases. 
 110. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992). 
 111. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114(1) (2006) (the per occurrence amount provided for in the 
statute is now $600,000 total and limited to no more than $150,000 per individual claimant). 
 112. DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 785. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 802. 
 115. See infra note 129. 
 116. See infra note 133. 
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IV.  LAWYER ADVERTISING: EXAMINING STRICTER CONSTRAINTS ON 
LAWYER SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS 
 
Persons who lobby for reform of the judicial system argue that the 
aggressive advertising practices of lawyers contribute significantly to 
increasing litigation in the United States.117 They contend that lawyer 
advertisements encourage litigation among parties who might not 
otherwise engage the process.118 In this way, advertising by lawyers 
directly results in more claims being filed.119 To reduce the filing of 
claims, they propose more rigid prohibitions on advertising by attorneys. 
While a reduction in advertising would reduce the number of claims 
filed, proponents of these measures fail to acknowledge that the bar 
already imposes significant limitations on lawyer advertising. Additional 
limitations on lawyer communications would interfere with 
constitutional rights and increase the cost of legal fees. 
 
A.  The Bar Imposes Limitations on the Nature and Scope of Lawyer 
Advertising 
 
Concerned that advertising might negatively affect the public’s 
perception120 of lawyers, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct limit 
the nature and scope of lawyer advertising. As a general rule, advertising 
is permitted.121 However, various rules impose limits on the nature of 
permissible communications. First, “[a] lawyer shall not make a false or 
 117. The claim that lawyer advertising is responsible for fueling the litigation explosion has 
been made for a long time. Those concerned about the advertising practices of lawyers became 
increasingly concerned subsequent to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which 
eliminated many of the States most stringent restrictions on the permissible scope of advertising by 
lawyers. 
 118. See e.g., Edward D. Re, Professionalism for the Legal Profession, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 683, 
693 (2001). 
 119. This proposition is not novel. Advertising encourages persons to engage in certain 
conduct (such as filing a lawsuit) though they might not otherwise be interested in doing so. See 
William Hornsby, Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles from the 150 Years War to Govern Client 
Development, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 255, 291 (2005) (“The battles among lawyers [about advertising] are 
fueled by the fact that advertising is effective. Simply put, it works. This is not to suggest that every 
lawyer who advertises gets a positive return on investment, but constant increases in the overall 
expenditures for yellow pages and television ads suggest that the public is responsive to ads to a 
degree that justifies the movement.”). 
 120. See e.g., Tonia Goolsby, Does Ambulance Chasing in Florida Justify Advertising Reform 
in Arkansas, 49 ARK. L. REV. 795, 809 (1997) (“a two-year study on lawyer advertising [indicated 
that people] have negative feelings about those attorneys who use direct mail advertising.”). 
 121. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2 cmt. (2006) (“To assist the public in 
obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through 
reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising . . . the 
public’s need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising.”). 
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misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”122 
Beyond being honest, lawyers must not make any statements that might 
mislead. Second, “[a] lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone 
contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with 
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a 
significant motive for . . . doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain.”123 
Third, lawyers shall not engage in any advertising that “involves 
coercion, duress or harassment.”124 These model rules, which are widely 
adopted among the states with only slight variations, demonstrate that 
state bar associations already significantly restrict the nature and scope of 
permissible advertising.125
Though persons critical of the judicial system claim otherwise, these 
rules are frequently enforced. In the case of Davis v. Alabama State Bar, 
the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a 60-day suspension for lawyers 
whose “advertisements were misleading.”126 In the case of In re Morse, 
the California Supreme Court increased sanctions against attorneys who 
had engaged in misleading advertising to deter similar wrongdoing by 
other attorneys.127 New York upheld a disciplinary order when an 
attorney solicited work from real estate brokers in violation of the 
pertinent ethical guidelines, which precluded any advertisement that 
might mislead the audience.128 The cited instances are not exhaustive. 
 122. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (misleading statements include 
statements that would give the client unjustified expectations). 
 123. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Proponents of more rigid restrictions claim that the existing rules do not do enough to 
restrict attorney advertising. In the next section, this Article explains that additional restrictions 
might violate freedom of speech, which is a foundational right in American society. 
 126. Davis v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 309 (Ala. 1996). Among other things: 
 
The Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Board found William Dowsing Davis III and Dan 
Arthur Goldberg to be violating Rule 1.1, Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct 
(failure to provide competent representation); Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (failure to keep clients 
reasonably informed and failure to reasonably explain a matter so as to permit a client to 
make an informed decision); Rule 5.1 (failure to make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
the lawyers in their firm conformed to the Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 5.3(b) 
(failure to ensure that the activities of a nonlawyer under an attorney’s supervision are 
compatible with professional standards); Rule 5.5(b) (providing assistance to a person 
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law); Rule 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct through the acts of another); Rule 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice); and Rule 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law). Both of the attorneys were 
suspended from the practice of law for 60 days. 
 
 127. In re Morse, 900 P.2d 1170 (Cal. 1995). 
 128. In re Green, 429 N.E.2d 390, 392 (N.Y. 1981) (indicating the violative mailer provided 
that “By recommending the services of [lawyer], you, the realtor, will save your clients time and 
money—one of the main reasons that they called on you.”). 
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State courts have frequently punished advertisements by lawyers when 
their communications fail to comply with adopted regulations.129
As substantial restrictions already exist, the choice presented is not 
one between no regulation on lawyer advertising and some regulation. 
Instead, the question is whether more rigid restrictions should be 
adopted. 
 
B.  Important Rights Will Be Infringed If More Significant Restrictions 
on Lawyer Advertising are Implemented 
 
Advocates of reform to curb the litigation explosion assert that the 
provisions contained in the Model Rules are not sufficient for one 
reason130 or another.131 While a complete or more substantial ban on 
advertising would reduce the amount of litigation, additional limitations 
would also raise important constitutional questions. 
In the case of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “[c]onstitutional protection for attorney advertising, 
and for commercial speech generally, is of recent vintage.”132 Until the 
1970’ s, the Court did not extend the protections of the First Amendment 
to protect the advertising communications of lawyers.133 However, the 
1977 case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona134 expanded the protections of 
the First Amendment to “invalidate a state rule prohibiting lawyers from 
advertising in newspapers and other media.”135 Nearly two decades of 
cases have built upon the foundation laid in the Bates case. Now, it is 
“well established that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as 
such, is accorded a measure of First Amendment protection.”136 While 
the Court recognized that some restrictions on lawyer advertising, such 
as those provided by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, were 
permissible, it held that an absolute prohibition was not.137 Most 
European legal systems have reached the same conclusion. They 
 129. See e.g., Richard Martel, Regulation of Advertising in the Legal Profession: Still Hazy 
after All these Years, 1997 DET. C.L. REV. 123 (1997). 
 130. Some claim that the Model Rules themselves do not go far enough to prevent the ills 
associated with lawyers who advertise. In essence, they contend that lawyers should be precluded 
from advertising altogether. 
 131. Others take a more moderate approach. They contend that the Rules should be made 
more rigid, and also that they should be enforced with more frequency and with more substantial 
penalties. 
 132. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 622–23 (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. at 632. 
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recognize the fundamental right that lawyers possess to communicate 
and advertise.138
Prohibiting lawyers from advertising might reduce the number of 
claims filed, but would also prohibit that class of individuals from 
exercising rights granted unto them by the Constitution. Any proposal 
that effectuates a denial or modification of constitutional rights should be 
cautiously considered. 
 
C.  Advertising by Lawyers Encourages Competition, which Results in 
Lower Prices. 
 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in the Bates case,139 numerous 
studies140 have been conducted to estimate the effects of the expanded 
First Amendment protection. Each of these studies arrived at the same 
conclusion: “Competition among lawyers, in the form of commercial 
advertising, has resulted in lower prices to consumers.”141 Advertising 
contributes to a perfect market,142 wherein consumers are able to 
compare the hourly rates of attorneys and the service that they render. 
Without the unfettered presentation of such information, price and value 
comparisons are infinitely more difficult to conduct. Permitting and 
protecting advertising has granted citizens an increased ability to 
compare the price and quality of legal services.143
 
 
 138. See e.g., Louise L. Hill, Publicity Rules of the Legal Profession within the United 
Kingdom, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323 (2003) (“Historically, the legal professions in European 
countries frowned upon or prohibited advertising by lawyers. . . . [A]s a result, many EU Member 
states abandoned their traditional rules prohibiting lawyer advertising in favor of permitting some 
form of advertising by lawyers. The jurisdictions of the United Kingdom (UK) were no exception.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 139. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (wherein the United States Supreme 
acknowledged that the First Amendment protected the right of lawyers to advertise). 
 140. Van O’Steen, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: The Personal Account of a Party and the 
Consumer Benefits of Lawyer Advertising, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245, 250 (Summer, 2005) (“Since Bates, 
at least four studies have been conducted—including two through grants from the National Science 
Foundation and one by the Federal Trade Commission—intended to measure the effect of 
advertising on the pricing of legal services.”). 
 141. Id. at 251. The author further states, “I know of no research that has concluded otherwise, 
and the debate on this question appears settled.” Id. 
 142. A perfect market is one wherein both the buyer and seller of goods or services possess an 
adequate amount of information. Such information allows them to negotiate effectively with one 
another and attribute the proper value to the services to be provided. 
 143. In a sense, the price charged by lawyer “A” serves as a check on the price that lawyer 
“B” is able to obtain for services of a similar nature. When parties are unable to ascertain what the 
general prices are, there is less of a check and price disparities are more likely to result. The legal 
community in Las Vegas has recently experienced price wars attributed to advertising. One personal 
injury attorney recently began advertising a contingency fee of 22 percent. Others followed suit. 
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V.  FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS ARE SUFFICIENTLY CONSTRAINED BY 
CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINES 
 
Legislative disdain for frivolous and vexatious lawsuits is clearly 
manifest in prominent places. “Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,144 Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,145 
and § 170 of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers,146 all seek to 
balance efforts to curb frivolous suits with an understanding that 
prohibitions against such suits should be tempered to avoid over-
enforcement.”147 Yet, some continue to argue that frivolous lawsuits 
contribute to the litigation explosion in an especially egregious 
manner.148 In the presidential debates of 1996, the candidates mentioned 
the problem of frivolous lawsuits three times.149 Like politicians, some 
scholars have also participated in the debate over meritless civil 
lawsuits.”150
Judge Posner noted that courts are unable to neatly distinguish valid 
 144. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or 
unrepresentative party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other 
legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (2006) (Emphasis added). 
 145. A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, 
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2005) (Emphasis added). 
 146. A lawyer may not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, 
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 
RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 110 (2000) (Emphasis added). 
 147. Erin Shiller & Jeffrey Wertkin, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 909 (2001). 
 148. Robert Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 806 (2004) (“Frivolous lawsuits are endemic to the entire legal system . . . .”). 
 149. Jeffrey Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special 
Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REV. 537, 538 (1997), quotes a statement from those debates 
wherein Bill Clinton stated: 
 
In the case of the product liability bill which they passed and I vetoed—I think that’s 
what he’s talking about—I actually wanted to sign that bill, and I told the people exactly 
what—the Congress exactly what kind of bill I would sign. Now a lot of the trial lawyers 
didn’t want me to sign any bill at all, but I thought we ought to do what we could to cut 
frivolous lawsuits, but they wouldn’t make some changes that I thought should be made. 
Now let me just give you an example. I had a person in the Oval Office who lost a child 
in a school bus accident where a drunk driver caused the accident directly, but there were 
problems with the school bus. The drunk driver had no money. Under the new bill, if I 
had signed it, a person like that could never have had any recovery. I thought that was 
wrong. 
 
 150. See id. 
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cases “from the utterly frivolous ones.”151 The distinction between 
frivolous cases and meritorious ones is messy because the determination 
depends on subjective application of an ambiguous definition. In the 
legal context, the term “frivolous” is defined as “given to triflings, not 
worth notice,” and “of little weight or importance, not worth notice of 
slight.”152 Accordingly, the subjective perspective of the person called 
upon to evaluate a claim determines whether it is frivolous or 
meritorious. For this reason, some frivolous cases inevitably find their 
way into the system,153 despite the ethical guidelines that prohibit 
lawyers from entertaining them. 
To further deter the filing of frivolous suits, some individuals 
contend that “certificates of merit” issued by designated experts or panels 
should be required before certain cases are permitted to proceed.154 These 
special certificates impose a more significant burden than already exists 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11155 by requiring the 
claimant to obtain a written expert opinion certifying that the merits of 
the particular case are valid. “The major goal typically [justifying the 
imposition of certification requirements] is a reduction in the number of 
frivolous claims.”156 Many states have already enacted these measures to 
reduce litigation in certain contexts. Among these, Illinois requires that a 
certificate of merit, issued by an expert, accompany the filing of a 
product liability claim.157 Illinois requires a similar certificate when one 
files an action for medical malpractice.158 In Florida, a medical 
negligence claimant must submit a “verified written medical expert 
opinion,” certifying that there are reasonable grounds for the claim 
before notice of the lawsuit is mailed.159 Similarly, a Georgia provision 
requires a certificate of merit in all civil actions for medical 
malpractice.160 California,161 Nevada,162 and the Virgin Islands163 have all 
 151. Crowley Cutlery Co. v. U.S., 849 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 152. See CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, p. 1832 (1986). 
 153. A case that one judge may deem “frivolous” may be designated “meritorious” by other 
judges or legal commentators. Similarly, those cases deemed meritorious by a particular judge may 
be criticized as frivolous or baseless by some legal commentators. 
 154. Id. (“State lawmakers have recently sought to deter certain types of frivolous claims by 
requiring special certificates of merit involving the use of an expert opinion.”). 
 155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (2006) (implying that an attorney certifies that a claim is 
meritorious upon permitting it to be filed for the consideration of the tribunal.). 
 156. Parness & Leonetti, supra note 149, at 541. 
 157. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., Title 735 § 52-622 (requiring affidavit and written report of 
an expert before a product liability action can be filed). 
 158. See 735 ILL. COMP STATE ANN., Title 735, §5/2-622(a). The Illinois law requiring an 
expert affidavit for medical malpractice was sustained despite constitutional attack. See DeLuna v. 
St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. 1992). 
 159. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2)(b) (2006). 
 160. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (2005) (requiring an expert certification after a complaint 
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enacted similar requirements. The United States Congress even proposed 
such a requirement at the federal level, though President Clinton 
ultimately vetoed the measure.164
These measures effectively preclude a number of suits. A reduction 
in the number of claims filed comes as no surprise; adding another 
procedural impediment makes filing a claim more expensive, more 
difficult, and less likely. In addition to the procedural impediments, a 
certification panel or expert is likely to prevent the introduction of many 
cases, and thereby reduce litigation. 
 
A.  Substantial Measures Already Exist to Deter Frivolous Suits from the 
System 
 
Various measures already exist to deter frivolous suits from entering 
the system. First, various procedural rules prohibit lawyers from 
introducing frivolous claims or defenses into the system.165 Among these 
prohibitions, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a lawyer may be subject to sanctions for pursuing a frivolous claim 
or relying on a frivolous defense. These provisions are frequently 
enforced. And “[c]oncern by the courts, particularly the federal courts, 
about abuse of judicial process has increased in recent years and has been 
manifest by a greater judicial willingness to impose sanctions [pursuant 
to Rule 11].”166 In addition to sanctions, lawyers may be punished for 
violating codes of professional conduct if they present frivolous claims 
or defenses for adjudication.167 Second, the economic realities of modern 
legal practice strongly encourage attorneys to refrain from bringing cases 
and answer are filed “[in] any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death, or property 
damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person.”). 
 161. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE 340.1(h)(1) and (2) (2005) (requires that a plaintiff seeking to 
recover damages stemming from sexual abuse as a child must first obtain certification from (1) his 
attorney and (2) from a licensed mental health practitioner.); see also 340.1(h)(2) (the licensed 
mental health provider cannot be a party to the litigation and must certify that there is a “reasonable” 
basis for the action). 
 162. Nevada employed a medical malpractice-screening panel to review these cases, though 
the procedural requirement that a plaintiff receive such certification has been abandoned. 
 163. Parness & Leonetti, supra note 149, at 561 (“In the Virgin Islands there is a Medical 
Malpractice Action Review Committee that, within the Office of the Commissioner of Health, 
arranges for the review of all prospective malpractice claims by experts before civil actions may be 
commenced.”). 
 164. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 165. See supra notes 144–46 for a summary of the ethical rules that constrain lawyers not to 
entertain or introduce frivolous matters. 
 166. MURRAY SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 
118 (Michie Publishers 1985). 
 167. See supra notes 144–46. 
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that are frivolous or “not worth notice.” Plaintiff attorneys retained on a 
contingency fee arrangement receive compensation only if they achieve 
certain results for their clients.168 Because their compensation is directly 
tied to success, these attorneys will not file claims unworthy of notice.169 
Additionally, lawyers charging an hourly rate are generally concerned 
about their reputation. In this way, the engagement of a lawyer on a case 
is an existing check on frivolous suits. In light of existing deterrents, it is 
valid to wonder whether frivolous suits present the significant problem 
that some persons contend they do. 
 
1.  The certification requirement may reduce more than frivolous 
litigation. 
 
As stated earlier, imposing a certification of merit requirement will 
reduce litigation, 170 by imposing another procedural hurdle that must be 
cleared before claims can be filed. However, certification requirements 
affect a broader range of claims than many proponents of the measures 
acknowledge. 
Adopting these certification requirements will preclude meritorious 
suits as well as frivolous ones. As “parties make litigation [] decisions 
based on the procedural setting, and not just on the merits, of a given 
case,”171 imposing additional procedural prerequisites to filing claims 
will inhibit all litigants from bringing their claims. The significant 
possibility that this requirement will intrude on the ability and tendency 
of individuals with meritorious claims to assert their rights is something 
that should be carefully considered before states rush to adopt the 
certification of merits requirements.172
 
 
 
 
 168. Many plaintiff attorneys are compensated on a contingency fee basis, meaning they are 
compensated only if they achieve certain results for their clients. If the case is “not worth notice,” it 
does not present a viable opportunity for victory or success. Lawyers are not likely to accept such 
representation or take such cases to court because they are unlikely to be paid for their efforts. For a 
discussion on the risks associated with contingency fee arrangements see e.g., Edell & Assocs. P.C. 
v. Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, 264 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 169. If the attorney believes that the claim is not worth notice, and the matter is contingent 
upon certain results, he or she will not invest time in that matter. 
 170. See Molot, supra note 43, at 60 (“In particular, lawyers and clients alike understand that 
the cost of litigation may affect outcomes.”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See e.g., Parness & Leonetti, supra note 149, at 578. (“Reform efforts must aim to deter 
frivolous claims without denying justice for claims with merit.”). 
  
179] THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 205 
 
2.  The certification requirements raise poignant Constitutional 
questions. 
 
Certification requirements have already been challenged on various 
constitutional grounds. These challenges have been framed in terms of 
separation of powers, equal protection, and the right to apply to courts 
for a redress of grievances.173
By imposing certification requirements on litigants, the legislature 
assumes the power of the judiciary, which, according to constitutional 
principles, has authority over “practice and procedure” before its 
tribunals.174 Because a special certificate requirement usurped the 
constitutional right of the court to set its own pleading rules, the Ohio 
Supreme Court held a certification requirement to be invalid.175 Upon 
review of a similar statute, the Illinois Supreme Court reached the same 
result, invalidating the legislatively imposed certification requirement.176 
These precedents demonstrate the judiciary’s concern that certificate of 
merit requirements step beyond the scope of legislative authority and into 
the realm of judicial operations.177
Certification requirements are also challenged as inconsistent with 
the principle of equal protection “since certificate of merit standards treat 
differently malpractice, product liability, or other specified claimants 
from all other claimants.”178 Certification requirements may implicate 
equal protection concerns by providing protections to certain defendants 
(i.e. negligent doctors) that are not provided to the public at large (i.e. 
 173. See e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 5. The right for a redress of grievances is also known as the 
right of a litigant to access courts. 
 174. See e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (2006). 
 175. See Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994) (The pertinent certificate 
requirement was found to be inconsistent with a pleading rule set by the Ohio Supreme Court 
whereby pleadings” need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit except when otherwise 
specified by the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.”). 
 176. See DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1147 (Ill. 1992) (In addition to 
finding that the statutory provision unconstitutionally infringed on the judicial branches right to 
determine pleadings rules, there was some concern that experts were being forced to perform a 
judicial function—assessing the merits of a particular claim—though not trained to do so. The 
majority disregarded that contention finding that the expert was not asked to render views 
concerning the outcome of the suit, which apparently would have been unconstitutional. Though it 
has been rejected, that contention is also one for consideration.). 
 177. It should also be noted that certification requirements have withstood similar 
constitutional assaults in other states. See e.g., Royle v. Fla. Hosp.-E. Orlando, 679 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (held that a certification requirement did not violate state constitutional right of 
access to courts); Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., 807 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Mo. 1991) (holding 
that the certification requirement did not violate jury trial or access to court challenges.). 
 178. Parness & Leonetii, supra note 149, at 581–82. Consistent with these requirements, a 
medical malpractice claimant may be forced to comply with a procedural requirement that an 
ordinary tort claimant does not have to worry about. 
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negligent drivers). This concern about unequal treatment is best 
illustrated by a hypothetical example. 
In both instances, assume that the claims arose in the State of Florida 
where an applicable statute requires persons claiming damages for 
medical malpractice to obtain a written expert opinion certifying that the 
cause of action is meritorious.179 Plaintiff A suffers nonpermanent 
injuries, valued at $100,000, due to a doctor’s malpractice. Conversely, 
Plaintiff B suffers nonpermanent injuries, valued at $100,000 when 
involved in an accident with a negligent driver. Further suppose that in 
both cases the relative defendants are 100 percent liable for the injuries. 
For all intents and purposes, the injuries sustained by Plaintiff A and by 
Plaintiff B are the same. Yet, the law imposes an additional burden and 
expense on Plaintiff A, who due to the certification statute must allocate 
time and money180 to obtain an expert certification before bringing the 
claim. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
As this Article demonstrates, proposals to reduce litigation and 
alleviate the consequences of increasing litigation abound. Many of these 
proposals would reduce litigation. But, none of them can be implemented 
without substantial consequences. Application of the British fee-shifting 
model could reduce litigation, but not without limiting access to courts 
and rendering the rights of wealthy persons and entities better protected 
than those of persons and entities without such resources. Damage caps 
could reduce the ills associated with increasing litigation, but not without 
usurping judicial power and imposing unjust results in individual cases. 
Rigid restrictions on lawyer advertising cannot reduce litigation without 
intruding on the First Amendment. 
Thus, the judicial system finds itself stuck in a quagmire. On one 
hand there appears to be a growing interest in reducing litigation to 
protect American industries. 181 On the other hand, the judicial system 
remains interested in protecting the rights of individuals and promoting 
access to courts. Serious consequences accompany each reform proposal. 
So what does all of this mean? 
 179. In fact, Florida does have such a provision. 
 180. See e.g., Michael Higgins, Running for Coverage: Hearing “No” for an Answer Does not 
Have to be the Final Word when an Insurance Company Denies a Client’s Claim, A.B.A. J., Oct. 
1997, at 62. (noting that “expert fees may run from $150 to $400 an hour.”). It should also be noted 
that doctors in some states are able to charge upwards of $2000 an hour for expert fees. Accordingly, 
the costs of reviewing a case and then issuing a certification of merit can be significantly costly. 
 181. Pressure to reduce litigation and control the litigation explosion is building in many 
social circles. 
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America’s unique judicial system stresses the importance of 
individual liberty and freedom. Yet a system that provides such freedom 
depends on a moral, and self-governing populace. Lawyers, as 
representatives of the judicial branch, have a unique responsibility to 
counsel their clients and administer the law with adequate regard for 
broad societal consequences. The best way to prevent litigation from 
unduly overwhelming society is to impress upon the minds of lawyers 
their positions as representatives of the judicial branch and 
representatives of the society served they serve. 
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